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PREAMBLE AND CERTIFICATION 
I have submitted this brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). I hereby 
certify that despite reasonable efforts, I have not been able to locate Mr. McClellan in order 
to give him a copy of this Anders Brief. I have cont.acted prior counsel for any cont.act 
information he may have for Mr. McClellan. Prior counsel could provide only a single 
telephone number. When I dialed the number, an automated message informed me that the 
number was no longer in service. I then cont.acted the licensed private investigation firm Court 
Ops for assistance in locating him. The agency was able to locate a last known address for 
him, which is the Crossroads Urban Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
I spoke with a representative of Crossroads on April 5, 2017. I provided her with Mr. 
McClellan's name, date of birth and known aliases. She informed me that Crossroads does not 
have any record of providing services to Mr. McClellan. She continued, however, to explain 
that the agency allows homeless persons to use their address when providing contacting 
information to the U t.ah Department of Motor Vehicles. Crossroads was not able to provide 
any further assistance in locating Mr. McClellan. 
Since the time of my appointment to this case, I have not received any cont.act from 
Mr. McClellan whatsoever. 
I am aware of the requirements for Anders brief set forth in State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 
304, 13 P.3d 1056, specifically the requirement that the brief be delivered to the client for 
additional input on issues that should be addressed. Under the circumstances, I have no means 
of complying with this requirement, so I respectfully request that the Court waive this 
requirement for this case. 
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After carefully exanurung the record and researching the governing law, I have 
concluded that an appeal based on the potential issues apparent from the record would be 
legally frivolous. I request, therefore, the Court' permission to withdraw as attorney of record . 
and allow Mr. McClellan, if he develops an interest in the appea~ to submit any further briefs 
that he deems oecessarv. 
/1~\ 
Dated this / l I day of April, 2017. 
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CORBETT & GWILLIAM, PLLC 
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lV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-103(e) (2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr. McClellan's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
1. Standard of Review: This Court reviews whether a trial court incorrectly denied a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 983 P .2d 556, 558 
(Utah 1999). The trial court's underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. 
Id. The "ultimate question of whether the t.rial court strictly complied with constitutional and 
procedural requirements for a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." 
Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558. 
2. Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2008); Utah R. Crim. P. 11; State v. 
RuiZJ 2012 UT 29, 282 P.3d 998; State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 279 P.3d 371; Nicholls v. State, 
2009 UT 12, 976. 
3. Statement of Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 129-30, 131-32, 388-91. 
II. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr. McClellan's motion to recuse 
Judge Kouris. 
1. Standard of Review: The question of disqualification due to judicial bias is a question 
of law that the court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the decision below. State 
v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). 
2. Determinative Law: Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 794 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; State v. Munguia, 
2001 UT 5, 253 P.3d 1082. 
3. Statement of Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 196, 267-68. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 18, 2015, the State filed an information against Theophelus Clay 
McClellan, Jr. (hereinafter "McClellan") with a single count of Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a Second Degree Felony. R. 1-2. The case proceeded to a preliminary hearing, during 
which the Court found that probable cause existed to bind McClellan over for trial. R. 72-73. 
Upon conclusion of the preliminary hearing, McClellan entered into a plea agreement with the 
State and pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a third degree felony. R. 65-73. Upon accepting the plea, the court immediately 
released McClellan, who had been incarcerated, to Pre-Trial Services and set the case for a 
sentencing hearing. R. 72-73. McClellan later requested to withdraw from his plea, and the 
court denied his request. R. 129-30; 131-32; 388-91. McClellan was eventually sentenced for 
time served and released without probation. R. 289-290. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The State accused McClellan with driving another person's vehicle while knowing that 
it had been stolen. R. 1-2. Although he requested and received the appointment of counsel, he 
filed pro se motions seeking immediate dismissal of the case on grounds that he was 
overcharged, that he had no knowledge the vehicle was stolen and that the vehicle's owner 
could not identify him. R. 10; 28-51. The court denied the motion to dismiss and set the matter 
for a preliminary hearing instead. R. 53. Before the preliminary hearing, McClellan filed a 
document complaining generally about his court-appointed attorney, and asked the court to 
"take care of these issues immediately," though the motion did not ask for the appointment 
of a new attorney. R. 48-56. 
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The trial court held the preliminary hearing on March 24, 2015. R. 329-64. The same 
public defender represented McClellan. R. 330. At the commencement of the hearing, 
McClellan asked to address the court directly; he moved to dismiss the case for deficient 
evidence and "overcharging.". R. 332-33. He also requested that the court order his attorney 
to follow his instructions, though he expressed his desire that the case move forward that day 
with that attorney. R. 333-36. After receiving evidence, the court determined that probable 
cause existed and bound the case over for trial. R. 359. 
After a break, the court recalled McClellan's case. R. 359. McClellan then entered a 
guilty plea to the reduced charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third 
degree felony. R. 359-362. The court received McClellan's Statement of the Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea2 (hereinafter the "Statement''). R. 65-71. In addition to receiving the 
Statement, the Court engaged in a Rule 11 colloquy with McClellan, reviewing and confirming 
each of the following rights, warnings, etc.: 
1. That McClellan was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; 
2. That he was in a position to make important decisions; 
3. That he read and understood English; 
4. That he went through the Statement with his attorney and had no questions about it; 
5. That he understood his rights to the presumption of innocent and the State's burden 
of proof, a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a unanimous verdict; 
6. That he understood the possible punishments associated with a third degree felony; 
and 
2 McClellan's Statement is attached as Addendum 1. 
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7. That he reviewed the elements of the charge with his attorney. 
R. 360-61.3 The court then received and accepted McClellan's guilty plea to the reduced 
offense after confirming with him that the stated factual basis-his driving a stolen car 
knowing that it was probably stolen-is "what happened." R. 362-63. Consistent with the plea 
agreement, the court released McClellan to pre-trial services pending the scheduled sentencing 
hearing. R. 72-73; 362-63. 
Before sentencing, McClellan filed a pro se Motion for Hearing to Compel the Court to 
Rule on the Expedited Motion to Dismiss the Case. R. 89-96. The motion sought dismissal 
on the grounds that a third degree felony was overcharging, and that overcharging of that 
magnitude is "reason enough for a complete dismissal of the case." Id He also filed an affidavit 
seeking dismissal of his appointed attorney. R. 98-104. Neither the State nor defense counsel 
responded to the motions. 
McClellan failed to appear at his sentencing hearing, and the court issued a warrant for 
his arrest, leaving the pro se motions unresolved. R. 105-109. After his arrest, he again filed pro 
se motions to dismiss the case and replace his public defender, alleging that his attorney 
"caused alot of duress" on him (sic.). R. 118-121; 125-128. He did not describe the attorney's 
specific conduct that placed him under duress. At his first hearing after his arrest, McClellan 
asked to withdraw from his plea because he had received "inadequate and insufficient and 
3 The relevant portion of the plea proceedings are attached as Addendum 3. 
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incompetent counsel." R. 376. He renewed his request to dismiss the case because he should 
have been charged with a lesser offense.4 R. 377. 
The court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea on February 8, 2016. R. 
383-391.5 At the hearing, McClellan moved for dismissal on grounds wholly unrelated to the 
voluntariness of his plea-Fourth Amendment claims apparently related to another case 
concurrently pending against him-so the trial judge redirected him to issues related to the 
plea proceedings. R. 385-89. As his grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea, McClellan stated 
that "[t]here was no evidence against me." R. 389. When asked whether additional grounds 
existed for withdrawing from his plea, McClellan responded, ''Yes, there is no evidence against 
me." R. 390. Determining that the stated reasons did not justify withdrawal of a guilty plea, 
the judge denied McClellan's motion. R. 131-32; 390. 
Because of the conflict of interest caused by McClellan's pro se filings, the original 
defense counsel withdrew and was replaced by conflict counsel. R. 137; 145. At a hearing on 
March 7, 2016, replacement counsel asked for time to review the case and hearing transcripts 
in order to investigate potential problems with McClellan's plea, including whether there was 
a conflict of interest between him and original counsel that could affect the plea's validity. R. 
304-05. The trial court obliged and continued the matter. R. 307-08. 
4 McClellan had new criminal charges when appeared after his arrest on the bench warrant. R. 
378. Those charges were set for a preliminary hearing independently of the hearing on the 
motion to withdraw from his plea in this case. Id. 
5 The relevant portions of the hearing are attached as Addendum 4. 
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Before the next hearing, McClellan filed a series of ex parte communications with the 
trial court requesting various forms of relief: 6 
1. A ruling on his motion to dismiss. R. 159; 
2. Dismissal of the case because his original attorney was not loyal to him and sided with 
the prosecutor. R. 162-63, 213-15; 
3. Dismissal because of overcharging and ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 165-66; 
4. That he was entitled to a reduction to lesser-included offenses; R. 169-71; 
5. Habeas corpus release because of original defense counsel's racist comments and lack 
of loyalty to his client. R. 177-78; 
6. Dismissal of the charges because his original attorney and replacement attorney 
intentionally deceived him. R. 180-81, 189-94, 217-20, 248, 270-72; 
7. Appointment of a third defense attorney for their lack of loyalty to him, including 
taking the stand of the prosecutor. R. 182-83. 
8. Recusal of Judge Kouris as the judge presiding over his case because he did not move 
the case fast enough, had violated his due process rights, and acted fraudulently. R. 196, 
267-68; 
9. Dismissal because defense counsel did not provide him with all of the discovery 
materials. R. 207-08; 
10. Release to pre-trial services because of the misconduct of his attorneys. R. 222-25; 
6 The requests and bases for the relief were made in a very shotgun-like fashion-very broad 
and non-specific. The communications contained very broad, sweeping allegations without 
any real description of the specific facts supporting them. As counsel has not been able to 
locate McClellan for additional details that may serve as a basis to supplement the record, 
counsel has been unable to assess the claims further for lack of factual specificity. 
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11. Release because the court would not rule on his motions. R. 226-27; 
12. Release to pretrial services on a demurrer theory. R. 229-34; 
13. Dismissal of the charges on Fourth Amendment grounds. R. 236-40; 
14. Dismissal of the charges because he did not understand what his original attorney 
explained to him before he entered the plea. R. 243; 
Because McClellan filed the requests in an ex parte manner, the Court did not take any 
action on the requests, except that it forwarded the recusal requests to the presiding judge for 
determination "as to whether a legally sufficient issue has been raised." R. 274. On assignment 
from the presiding judge, Associate Presiding Judge Ryan Harris denied the request on the 
grounds that McClellan's "non-specific complaints simply do not allege the sort of 
circumstances that typically amount to 'deep-seated favoritism or antagonism' against 
Defendant." R. 276-78. 
McClellan appeared at his sentencing hearing on June 15, 2016. R. 314-323. 
Replacement counsel, about whom McClellan complained in his ex parte filings, represented 
him. R. 16. McClellan entered into a plea in a separate case and was sentenced in both cases 
to time served with immediate release from incarceration. R. 3-7. Despite the McClellan's 
flurry of activity between hearings, and his tendency to address the court directly in other 
hearings, McClellan did not speak other than to answer questions related to the voluntariness 
of his plea in the other case. Id. Neither he nor his attorney asked the trial court to address any 
of the concerns raised in the multitudinous pleadings. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I: 
McClellan cannot overcome the trial court's conclusion that his guilty pleas were 
knowing and volunt.ary. A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea must prove that his plea 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. To prove that a plea was not knowing or voluntary, 
the defendant must show either that he did not in fact understand the nature of the 
constitutional protections that he was waiving by pleading guilty, or that he had such an 
incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission 
of guilt. 
A prerequisite to entering a knowing and voluntary plea is that the defendant must be 
mentally competent to enter it. McClellan cannot prove that he lacked the ability to understand 
the proceedings and the consequence of his plea. 
Further, nothing in the record indicates that McClellan did not act knowingly or 
voluntarily when he pleaded guilty. A defendant does not enter a knowing and voluntary plea 
if his attorney made a material representation to induce him to plead guilty. The record does 
not contain any indication that McClellan's attorneys made misrepresentations to him or 
otherwise acted contrary to his interests. 
Finally, the trial court's strict compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 
C'Rule 11 ") also prevents McClellan from arguing that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
When a trial court complies with all the provisions of Rule 11, the court forecloses many 
potential arguments that the defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The 
trial court strictly complied with Rule 11 by having McClellan read and execute a statement in 
8 
support of his guilty plea, by ensuring that he understood it, by ensuring that he understood 
the elements of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty and that he was waiving his many 
constitutional rights. 
Issue II: 
McClellan cannot show on direct appeal that his conviction should be reversed because 
of the trial judge was biased against him. Appellate courts have long held that motions seeking 
to disqualify a judge must identify an extrajudicial source of the bias. A finding of bias usually 
cannot stem for occurrences in the courtroom. Adverse rulings alone are insufficient to 
establish the existence of bias. None of the rulings approach support the conclusion that Judge 
Kouris had a deep-seated animosity against McClellan. To the contrary, his actions indicate 
judicial temperance and objectivity. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no appealable issue as to whether McClellan knowingly and voluntarily 
pleaded guilty. 
McClellan cannot overcome the trial court's conclusion that he had identified 
insufficient justification for withdrawing from his plea. A defendant seeking to withdraw a 
guilty plea must prove that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2)(a) (2008); State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ,I 37, 282 P.3d 998; State v. Alexander, 2012 
UT 27, ,r 23,279 P.3d 371. To prove that a plea was not knowing or voluntary, the defendant 
"must show either that he did not in fact understand the nature of the constitutional 
protections that he was waiving by pleading guilty, or that he had such an incomplete 
understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." 
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Alexander, 2012 UT 27, iJ 23 (internal citations omitted). Unfortunately, McClellan cannot 
satisfy this burden. 
A. Nothing in the record indicates that McClellan was incompetent to enter a 
plea. 
McClellan cannot prove that he lacked the ability to understand the nature and 
consequences of his guilty plea. "A prerequisite to entering a knowing and voluntary plea is 
that the defendant must be mentally competent to enter it." Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, iJ 20, 
203 P.2d 976. A defendant is incompetent if a mental disorder renders him unable "(1) ... to 
have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment 
specified for the offense charged" or "(2) . .. to consult with his counsel and to participate in 
the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77-15-2 (2008). 
A trial court must ascertain a defendant's competency where there is a substantial 
question of possible doubt as to the defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea. 
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, iJ 13, 20 P.3d 382, citing State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 
1996). But it is not required to question a defendants competency "unless defense counse~ 
the prosecutor, or the custodian of a defendant files a petition alleging incompetence." 
Nicholls, 2009 UT 12 at iJ 22. 
While defining competency is a legal matter, whether a defendant is competent to enter 
a guilty plea is reviewed for clear error. State v. Barz.ee, 2007 UT 95, iJ 83, 177 P.3d 48. "To 
show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
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therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. Higginbotham, 917 
P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). 
McClellan cannot prove that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea. During his 
colloquy with the trial judge preceding his plea, McClellan's answers and language demonstrate 
his understanding and mental status. He affirmatively stated that he was not under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol. He stated that he was in an position to make "important 
decisions." McClellan understood the English language and reviewed the plea Statement with 
his counsel. His Statement affirmed these facts, but it added much more: McClellan affirmed 
that he believed himself to be of "sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of [his] plea." Moreover, he certified 
that he was "free of any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent him from 
understating what [he] was doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
[his] plea." R. 69. 
After reviewing each page of the record, counsel cannot locate any evidence suggesting 
that McClellan suffered from any kind of condition that could render him incompetent to 
enter a plea. Nothing indicates that the Court should have identified the issue sua .ponte, and 
counsel cannot identify any indication that a party raised the issue of competence to the court. 
Similarly, counsel cannot identify any evidence suggesting that trial counsel should have 
identified a competency problem and raised it to the trial judge. Any appeal based on 
McClellan's competence would, therefore, be frivolous. 
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B. Nothing in the record indicates that trial counsel's conduct resulted in an 
invalid plea. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel contributes to a flawed guilty plea when counsel's 
performance renders the plea involuntary or unknowing. State v. F.hinehatt, 2007 UT 61, if 13, 
167 P.3d 1046. A plea is not voluntary when made with "an exaggerated belief in the benefits 
of a plea." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Utah 1988)7, quoting People v. Lawson, 255 
N.W.2d 748, 750 (1977). See also Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975) (incorrect 
statement to defendant that maximum prison term was much higher than the law allowed 
rendered plea involuntary, as defendant believed that he minimized his risk by a greater 
degree). 
A guilty plea "entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his counsel' normally 
must stand. Bracfy v. United States, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970) (emphasis added). But a plea 
may not stand where it is induced by misrepresentation, including "unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises." Id. See also Santobello v. New York, 92 S.Ct. 495,499 (1971) (when a plea rests on a 
promise ... , such promise must be fulfilled). According to Bracfy, defense counsel's 
misrepresentation of the plea benefits may plea involuntary even where no evidence suggests 
that the prosecutor made the promise. In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant satisfies 
Strickland's prejudice prong by proving that "but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
7 Copeland was superseded by statute on other grounds. See State v. Swagger, 2013 UT App 164, 
,r 10, 306 P.3d 840. 
12 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Martz"net 2001 UT 12, ,r 17, 
26 P.3d 203.s 
In his ex parte filings, McClellan repeatedly states that his attorney misled him about the 
case before or at the time he entered his plea. Unfortunately, he did not describe in any sort 
of detail how his attorney deceived him. He does not identify any specific statements that he 
believed were misleading or otherwise resulted in an involuntary plea. Moreover, his 
statements during the hearing on his request to withdraw from his plea cannot support him 
on appeal: He told the judge that no evidence supported the charges, and, when asked if there 
was anything else, he merely repeated the same claim. 
Replacement counsel, who stated he would review the recordings of the prior hearings 
and investigate whether there was any conflict of interest between McClellan and his original 
attorney, did not raise any claims related to the original attorney's performance or supplement 
any information already provided by McClellan. 
Finally, McClellan asserted in his pro se filings that he was under duress, caused by his 
counsel, when he entered the plea. Consistent with his other filings, he did not identify the 
facts and circumstances supporting the claim. He did not identify promises or threats made to 
him or any other kind of undue influence. And contrary to his duress claims, his Statement 
avows, "I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to me .... No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me." Given the lack of specificity in McClellan's claims, and the 
8 Martz"nez was superseded by statute on other grounds. See State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,i 
26 n. 42,279 P.3d 371. 
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contrary evidence available in the record, there is an insufficient basis to challenge the validity 
of his guilty plea on appeal. 
C. The trial court strictly complied with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 
The trial court's strict compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 ('Rule 11 ") 
also prevents McClellan from arguing that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. A plea "is 
not knowing and voluntary when the defendant does not understand the nature of the 
constitutional protections that he is waiving, or because he has such an incomplete 
understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt" 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r 29. Rule 11 is a "prophylactic measure that is designed to protect an 
individual's rights when entering a guilty plea by ensuring that the defendant receives full 
notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the 
consequences of the plea, etc." Id. at iJ 17. Furthermore, when a trial court "complies with all 
the provisions of rule 11, the court forecloses many potential arguments that the defendant's 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. at iJ 24. 
In relevant part, Rule 11 states: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(l) if the defendant is not represented by counse~ he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that 
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
(e)(S) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)[l) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, 
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Reviewing the trial court's questioning of McClellan and the written statement he 
executed, the trial court strictly complied with Rule 11, with evidence in the record supporting 
a finding that each element of Rule 11(e) was met: 
• (e)(l) McClellan was advised of his right to counsel and did not waive it. 
• (e)(2) McClellan executed a certificate of voluntariness that he was acting "of [his] own 
free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful influence of any kind have been 
made to get me to plead guilty ... No promises except those contained in this statement 
have been made to me." 
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• (e)(3) McClellan was advised of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
"7l.tnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived. 
• (e)(4)(A) McClellan was advised of the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading 
guilty, that the prosecution would have the burden to prove those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that a guilty plea was an admission of those elements. 
• (e)(4)(B) A factual basis for the plea was provided. 
• (e)(S) McClellan was advised of the potential sentence that he could receive, any 
minimum mandatory sentence, and the possibility of consecutive sentences. 
• (e)(6) The trial court was advised of the plea deal that McClellan accepted. 
• (e)(/) McClellan was advised of the time limits to file a motion to withdraw his plea. 
• (e)(8) McClellan was also advised of his right to appeal if he were convicted by a jury 
and that his right to appeal after pleading guilty would be limited. 
Although the trial court did not discuss all of Rule 11 's requirements from the bench, 
McClellan's Statement filled in any gaps in the hearing colloquy. Further, the Statement's 
certification of voluntariness stated, 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that 
I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not 
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
McClellan signed the Statement, and his attorney certified that McClellan had "read the 
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statement or that [he] read it to him." 
As illustrated, the trial court strictly complied with Rule 11 by having McClellan execute 
the Statement and ensuring that McOellan read and nnderstood it. It also had a colloquy with 
him to ensure that he was acting knowingly and volnntarily. Therefore, inasmuch as the trial 
court strictly complied with Rule 11, McClellan cannot show that the trial court committed 
clear error when it found that he acted knowingly and voluntarily when he pleaded guilty. 
II. There is insufficient evidence to support McClellan's claim that Judge Komis was 
biased against him. 
A judge should be disqualified when competent evidence suggests that the judge's 
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273,278 (Utah 1989). 
But appellate courts have long held that motions seeking to disqualify a judge must identify an 
extrajudici.al source of the bias. State v. Mungui,a, 2011 UT 5, ,r 17, 253 P.3d 1082. Bias or 
prejudice usually cannot stem for occurrences in the courtroom. Id. Adverse rulings alone 
"are insufficient to establish the existence of bias." Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ,r 52, 794 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized this rule: 
Opinions formed by judges on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring 
in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not 
constitute a basis for a bias or a partiality motion unless they display a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 
Liteky v. Uni-ted States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 
In this ~e, the record lacks any support for a claim that Judge Kouris was biased 
McOellan's bias clauns derive solely from his frustration with adverse rulings. Yet he fails to 
identify specifically which rulings demonstrate bias, so it is impossible to evaluate which 
rulings he believes manifest bias. 
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Counsel has reviewed each of the rulings made by Judge Kouris. None of the rulings 
can support a conclusion that he had a deep-seated animosity against McClellan. To the 
contrary, his actions indicate judicial temperance and objectivity. For example, although not 
bound by recommendations made in the plea agreement, he followed the recommendations 
to release McClellan from jail on the day he entered his plea and then, at sentencing, released 
McClellan from incarceration ,vith credit for time served v,-ithout even imposing terms of 
probation on him for a felony offense. Judge Kouris allowed McClellan to delay proceedings 
so that his attorney could investigate claims related to the voluntariness of his plea and work 
out global resolucions to the cases pending against him. 
A review of the record indicates that any challenge to Judge Kouris's impartiality would 
be wholly without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with Anders v. Califomia, I have examined the record for issues which 
might arguably support an appeal. In my opinion, there are none. Consequently, I respectfully 
move to withdraw from this case in accordance with Anders and ask the Court to rule on this 
appeal accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted this t.,,rt-\·1 day of April, 2017. 
CORBETT & GWILLIAM, PLLC 
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Addendum 1 
Relevant Statutes and Rules 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, 
unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until 
the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty 
and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. 
If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea 
of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than 
felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written 
@ demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the 
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise 
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk 
of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
~ agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; 
and 
(e)(B) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written 
statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, 
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understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise 
concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, 
no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground 
for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant 
orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or 
transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the 
basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, 
the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(i)(1 )The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, 
may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea 
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw the plea. 
0) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on 
appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements 
of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is 
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-103. 
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance 
from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. 
Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty 
plea. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea, UT ST§ 77-13-6 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 13. Pleas (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-13-6 
§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea 
Currentness 
(I) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion 
before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, 
a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under 
Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Credits 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, § I; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, 
c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 251, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-13-6, UT ST§ 77-13-6 
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session. 
© 2017 Th01:1s 0),, ?.~mer,. No cl:iim to original V.S. Government W,)rk:;. 
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§ 77-15-2. "Incompetent to proceed" defined, UT ST§ 77-15-2 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 15. Inquiry into Sanity of Defendant 
U.C.A 1953 § 77-15-2 
§ 77-15-2. "Incompetent to proceed" defined 
Currentness 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder or mental 
retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment 
specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding. 
Credits 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 142, § l; Laws 1994, c. 162, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-15-2, UT ST§ 77-15-2 
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session. 
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FIi.Ei DISTRICT COUIT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2' 5 2015 
SALT I.AKE. COUNTY 
Deputy Clsrk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
~h-o1 "J,, f{\('J.~~l \ tt~ 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUil TY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF 
COUNSEL 
C N J.:;1?'01..\Jl"" ase. o. ___ ....;...._,. •--~--
l.f""~~!g' \"lla,t,hJ12b hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the f~llowing crimes: 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
· Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
~}:~ 
1trCP-4~ (b) 
S b"-+ .e. &-\~ t.-tR.. -s l--<:) f-.< L =>vn ~ 
t,\ V\ .t-\ ~ -e. h-1 "'- \ ~-u ·p..,r'\f ·, .;, .. ~ 
Degree Punishment 
· Min/Max and I or 
Minimum Mandato~ __ _...l. ~()L 
'u~ '-'-St.p ?,~, 1v 0 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it. 
or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing aimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute 
or contest) ·that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other 
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to 
accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the eleme11ts of the crime(s) to which I 
am pleading guilty {or no contest): · 
. 0 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following · 
rights und~r the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if 
I plead·guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
.. 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 
I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have r,ot) {have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for-the following reasons:. _______________________ _ 
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If I have waived my rights to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and 
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am 
pleading guilty ( or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases 
an~ the consequences of my guilty {or no contest) plea(s). ____ ~
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is .2:) CA.--"-l?fek}...___ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences 
of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial: I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses: I know that if I were to 
have a. trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would 
have the opportunifX to cross-examine all of the witness~s who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses: 1 know that if I were to have a trial, I could call , 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the 
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination: I know that if I were 
to have a trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also ·know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against 
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof: I know that if I do not plead 
guilty {or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of 
the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not 
guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a mal, the State wquld have the burden of 
proving each element of the charges(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before 
a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me 
guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal: I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am 
gMng up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand 
that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after 
my sentence is entered. 
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I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up 
all the statutory and constitutional rights as- explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties: I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading gullty 
(or no contest) to a aime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to 
serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may Include a prison 
term, fine. or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an ninety percent (90%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, Including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as 
part of a plea agreement 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms: I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentenpes may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or 
they may run at the same time ( concurrently). I know that I may be charged an 
additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now 
pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole. I know the law requires 
the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the 
reco~ that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result 
of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, 
duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: 
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Trial J~dge not bound: I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the 
charges for sente~ci~g, made ~r sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting 
attorney are not bmdtng on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me 
as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, 
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation under United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my immigration status, 
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the United States. I 
understand that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration 
status, I should consult with an immigration attorney. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). 
No promises except those contained in this statement have been '!lade to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I · 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make 
any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with advice and assistance of my attorney. ,_ . x~ . 
I am t:;~. years of age. I have attended school through the~ grade. I can 
read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an 
interpreter has be~n provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and-discerning mind and to be mentally capable 
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of 
any mental disease, defect, or impainnent that would prevent me from understanding 
what I am doing or from knowingly, intel1igently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. 
I understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
· agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and 
volunbJrily· made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s} made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post ... conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, 
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 2~ day of ~f'o~ • 20~ 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for . , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it 
to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully U1Jderstands 
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief. after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly . 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in ~e foregoing affidavit, are accurate and tru 
OR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ':')~Les.-
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
-------
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and 
find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to . 
encourage a plea has been offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on 
the record before the Court There ls reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are 
entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) woul se e the pubHc interest. 
PR SEyJJJJfi.G,JnTORNEY 
Bar No.~ 
00070 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certifications of 
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are 
freely, kJ:lowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to 
the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
, ....... 
Dated this Z r{ day of ____ ____.-'=--___,..+--
10/10 felony plea - ed. 
00071 
Addendum3 
Plea Colloquy Transcript 
Preliminary Hearing - March 24, 2015 
1 the Court to dismiss. 
2 THE COURT: Well, at this stage of the proceeding, I'm 
3 required to make reasonable inferences in favor of the State. It 
4 doesn't mean that those inferences persist through trial, but 
5 this isn't trial. This is preliminary hearing. Based on that, I 
6 think reasonable inference can be made that the defendant knew 
7 the car was stolen, knew about the stolen plates, and therefore, 
B I'm going to bind over on each of the two counts, set a status 
9 hearing in front of Judge, Kouris. 
10 
11 
12 Judge. 
13 
14 
15 
16 exhibits? 
COURT CLERK: I can do March 30, at 8:30. 
MR. POPPLETON: I 1m going to be out of town that day, 
COURT CLERK: April 6? 
MR. POPPLETON: April 6 is fine. 
THE COURT: Okay, counsel, do you want to retrieve your 
17 
18 
[Court calls unrelated cases]. 
MR. POPPLETON: Judge, would you recall the Theophelus 
19 McClellan case? 
20 
21 
22 Judge. 
23 
THE COURT: Case number 151902115? 
MR. POPPLETON: And if we could approach briefly, 
THE COURT: Sure. So we•re back on the record in case 
24 number 151902115. Mr. McClellan's here again. Mr. McClellan, 
25 counsel informs me you•re prepared to enter a plea to a, was it a 
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1 third-degree felony? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
MR. POPPLETON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. McClellan? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs or 
6 alcohol today? 
7 
a 
MR. MCCLELLAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you•re in a position to make 
9 important decisions? Do you feel like you're in a good place to 
10 make important decisions today? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you read and understand English 
all right? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did you go through a written form with 
counsel today? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me about that 
32 
19 form at all? ~ 
20 
21 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I do not. 
THE COURT: Okay, so you understand that by entering a 
22 plea here, you would be giving up your presumption of innocence? 
23 
24 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You give up the right to trial by jury, the 
25 right to confront the witnesses against you and cross examine 
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1 them, the right to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable 
2 doubt each of the elements of the crime charged, and that a jury 
3 would have to reach a unanimous verdict as to those elements. You 
4 got to answer audibly. The only record we have is--
5 
6 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is a third-degree felony. It•s 
7 punishable by up to five years in prison, and a fine of up to 
8 $9,500 when you include surcharges. Do you understand that? 
9 
10 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you gone through the elements of 
11 the charges of the counsel? 
12 
13 
MR. POPPLETON: Yes, we have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, any reason we shouldn 1 t 
14 proceed with a plea today? 
15 
16 
MR. POPPLETON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay, if you haven•t already, go ahead and 
17 sign the fo:cm, and for the record, while Mr. McClellan executes 
18 that, could I have a factual basis please? 
19 
20 here--
21 
22 
MR. POPPLETON: Yes, Judge, let me look at my form 
THE COURT: Okay, sorry. 
MR. POPPLETON: Your Honor, yeah, so the elements and 
23 the facts that support those elements would be on February 13 of 
24 this year in Salt Lake County, Mr. McClellan attempted to retain 
25 a vehicle, believing it was probably stolen with the intent to 
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1 deprive the owner. The facts are, in essence, he was driving a 
2 stolen vehicle. 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: Is that what happened, sir? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And you understand that by entering this 
6 plea, you're essentially admitting to those facts and the 
7 elements of the amended charge? And effectively, you're giving up 
8 your rights to appeal. Do you understand that? 
9 
10 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. Well then for the record, as to 
11 the charge of--is it, are we amending by attempt? Is that what--
12 
13 
MR. POPPLETON: Attempt. 
THE COURT: --attempted theft by receiving stolen 
14 property, a third-degree felony, on February 13, 2015. How do you 
15 plead? 
16 
17 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I'll accept your plea, find that it was 
18 knowing, voluntary and intelligently made. Order a pre-sentence 
34 
19 report. Is that right? ~ 
20 MR. POPPLETON: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, and we 1 ll set it for sentencing in 
22 front of the assigned judge, and I believe, counsel, you 
23 indicated you wanted to address Mr. McClellan's release status? 
24 MR. POPPLETON: Yes, Judge. As I indicated, and I noted 
25 on the front of that form, the State is going to affirmatively 
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1 stipulate or agree that he be released and ordered to pre-trial 
2 services. I have an order of release to pre-trial services here 
3 if the Court is inclined to follow that recommendation. 
4 Also, as indicated on the first part of that, Mr. 
5 McClellan, as part of this deal is agreeing to pay the noted 
6 amount in restitution without a restitution hearing. That number 
7 is approximately $528. There's also an agreement that if the 
8 State seeks additional restitution greater than that amount, that 
9 that portion would be subject to dispute via a restitution 
10 hearing. 
11 
12 
13 
THE COURT: All right. Is that right, Mr. McClellan? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, I'll sign the release to 
14 pre-trial services. Mr. McClellan, a couple things. First, we're 
15 going to set a date for sentencing shortly. If you were to make a 
16 motion to withdraw your plea, you would have to make that in 
17 writing prior to that hearing. It doesn't mean that it's granted. 
18 It just means that that motion has to be made prior to being 
19 sentenced. 
20 And second, I'm going to put here that you're reporting 
21 to pre-trial services. Make sure you do that. A lot of folks mess 
22 up with that. 
23 
24 years. 
25 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I don't have no [inaudible] the last 10 
THE COURT: Yeah, so make sure you do that, and also, 
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l I'm ordering a pre-sentence report, where you'll be talking with 
2 Adult Probation & Parole. That'll help the sentencing judge with 
3 their decision regarding what to do with this charge. Even given 
4 the recommendations, they need that information. 
5 MS. TURNER: And Your Honor, on that pretrial release 
6 order, would it be possible to also impose drug and alcohol 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
[inaudible] ? 
THE COURT: Any problem with that? 
MR. POPPLETON: No, Judge, expected. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay, good luck, Mr. McClellan. 
COURT CLERK: May 18? 
THE COURT: Does that work for everybody? May 18? 
MR. POPPLETON: Yes, give you a notice of that. Judge, 
14 that's all I have if I can be excused. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Yes, thanks. 
MR. POPPLETON: Thank you. 
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Addendum.4 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Withdraw- Plea 
1 
2 
3 
4 McClellan. 
5 
Change of Plea Hearing - February 8, 2016 
SALT LAKE, UTAH; MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2016; 2:05 p.m. 
THE COURT: Who's next? 
MR. POPPLETON: Judge, if you could call Theo 
THE COURT: McClellan? Sure. Let•s call the case of The 
6 State of Utah vs Mr. Theo McClellan. Is mister--oh, he•s in 
7 custody? 
8 MR. POPPLETON: Yes. Your Honor, did you see his filing 
9 that appears to have been filed February 3? 
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Yes, I have them both here in front of me. 
MR. POPPLETON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let•s call the case of The State of Utah vs 
13 Mr. Theo McClellan. Good afternoon, Mr. McClellan. 
14 
15 
16 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Good afternoon. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. POPPLETON: Your Honor, it•s my understanding that 
17 Mr. McClellan intends on addressing the Court himself in a prose 
18 manner, and so I'm here to standby. 
19 THE COURT: I appreciate that, Mr. Poppleton. Mr. 
20 McClellan, I've had a chance to read what you•ve already given 
21 me, but whatever else you'd like to add, you•re more than welcome 
22 to do that. 
23 MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes, sir. This is for the record. I am 
24 Theophelus Clay McClellan, prose, case number 161900526, 
25 February 8, 2016. I am respectfully requesting a fast and speedy 
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1 trial with evidentiary hearing right now. 
2 This motion herein is to dismiss the charges. This is 
3 the case ruling Theophelus Clay McClellan vs The State of Utah, 
4 the 2009 ruling, Theophelus Clay McClellan vs The State of 
5 California, a 1994 ruling, Michael Grand Foster vs The State of 
6 Arizona, a 1997 ruling. The purpose is the federal exclusionary 
7 rule, served as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct. 
8 Exclusionary rule, the search warrant. The fourth 
9 amendment requires that a search warrant be issued by a 
10 magistrate or judge, who must, after receiving an oath of 
11 affirmation from the warrant applicant, make an independent, 
12 neutral and detached determination whether probable cause exists 
13 to believe that particular described property will be found at a 
14 particular place. 
15 When applying for a warrant, an officer must present an 
16 affidavit that contains facts that support a finding of probable 
17 cause. The warrant and the affidavit, or testimony on which it•s 
18 based, must be legally sufficient. They must contain facts that 
19 show a crime was committed, and facts that indicate why evidence 
20 will be found in a given place. cursory, assertions, and 
21 [inaudible] allegations will not support a warrant. 
22 The sufficiency of the affidavit is judged based on the 
23 totality of the circumstances, State vs Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, Utah 
24 CT APP 1994, contains to observe warrantless arrests. 11As every 
25 officer knows, our society is overrun with drugs. Many people 
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1 rely on the police to fight this war against drug activity. The 
2 police officer must resist the temptation to use whatever means 
3 possible in fighting this war. Courts will not tolerate a 
4 violation of constitutional rights merely because it occurs in 
5 the fight against drugs. 11 
6 Application, the exclusionary rule applicable only to 
7 constitutional violations of governmental actors. 11A violation of 
8 privacy by individuals who is not an agent of the government, is 
9 not a constitutional violation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule 
10 would not apply to such intrusions. 0 See US vs Jacobsen, 466 US 
11 109, 1984. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I'm not exactly sure where we're 
13 headed with that. Let me tell you two things that come to mind 
14 then. I'm going to have Ms. Turner discuss that as well. As for 
15 the portion you talked about a search warrant, this is not a 
16 search warrant case. This case apparently, and these are only 
17 probable cause. These aren't things that I'm telling you that are 
18 truth. These are things that are alleged, is that there was an 
19 officer behind you in a vehicle and ran the plate, and the plate 
2 0 came back as a stolen car. 
21 So as a result, they have probable cause to pull you 
22 over. Then when they asked you about it--
23 MR. MCCLELLAN: This isn't the case, Your Honor. This 
24 is not that case. 
25 THE COURT: This is what? 
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l MR. MCCELLAN: This is not that case. This case number 
2 is 161900526. 
3 
4 
THE COURT: Oh, I--
MS. TURNER: [Inaudible]. What you just stated, that is 
5 a probable cause- -
6 
7 
8 
THE COURT: For this case? 
MS. TURNER: It is. 
THE COURT: So I guess you might have another case. 
9 Does he have a different case number? Would you pull that up? Oh, 
10 that•s the case that's set for preliminary hearing. That's not 
11 the case today. The case today is 151902115. When is his prelim 
12 set, Mr. Poppleton? 
13 
14 
MR. POPPLETON: The 16th, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. So that's this coming, a week from 
15 tomorrow is the case that you're talking about right there, okay? 
16 MR. MCCLELLAN: I'm requesting an evidentiary hearing 
17 on both cases. 
18 THE COURT: Well, you're going to have an evidentiary 
19 hearing on the other one, but I think this one you've already 
20 entered a plea on. 
21 
22 
MR. MCCLELLAN: No, I pulled my plea on this case. 
THE COURT: Well, you have to ask the judge if you can 
23 pull your plea yet, and I don't see that you have. Could we--
24 
25 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Well, I asked--
THE COURT: Okay, so today is the motion to withdraw 
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1 the plea. So tell me, what is the reason that I should withdraw 
2 the plea that you've made? 
3 MR. MCCLELLAN: There was no evidence against me. 
4 That's why I requested an evidentiary hearing so we can bring 
5 forth the evidence that is against me. 
6 THE COURT: Well, that's not the question. The question 
7 is, there was a time that you entered a plea. Let me find it 
8 here. 
9 
10 
MR. MCCLELLAN: And then my counsel. This is--
THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on. It looks like there was a 
11 preliminary hearing held in this case, and then we have you, I 
12 guess, you were sent out for a pre-sentence report and you didn't 
13 show up, and a warrant was issued, and--oh, here it is. You've 
14 already entered a plea admitting that on February 13, 2015, in 
15 Salt Lake County, I attempted to retain a vehicle believing it 
16 was probably stolen with the intent to deprive the owner. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I didn't admit to anything. 
THE COURT: Well, you signed it. 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I didn't admit to anything. 
THE COURT: Well, you signed it. 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Unlawful use of a motor vehicle is not 
22 a, it's not a second degree or a third degree. 
23 
24 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I'm being overcharged, and that's why I 
25 used the case ruling Theophelus Clay McClellan vs the State of 
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1 California in 1998. 
2 THE COURT: All right, very good. Do you have any other 
3 reasons you 1 d like to withdraw that plea? 
4 
5 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Yes, there is no evidence against me. 
THE COURT: Okay, that•s not a valid reason to withdraw 
6 a plea. So I'm going to deny that motion. 
7 MR. MCCLELLAN: Well, I 1 ll put in a motion for an 
8 evidentiary hearing then. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. We'll put that motion back on the 
10 22nd. My guess is after the 16th, whatever happens to that other 
11 case will be put on the 22nd as well, and we 1 ll handle both of 
12 those cases at the same time, all right? 
13 MR. MCCLELLAN: No, I refuse, I refuse to have them 
14 globalized. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MCCLELLAN: I do not want my cases globalized. 
THE COURT: That•s actually not your call. 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Well, it is my call. It's my right. 
THE COURT: Really, where do you have that right? 
MR. MCCLELLAN: Whatever you do against my rights, I 
21 will appeal. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, fair enough. All right, Mr. 
23 Poppleton, anything else? 
24 
25 
MR. POPPLETON: That•s it, Judge, if I can be excused. 
MS. TURNER: Your Honor, I'm sorry. We do still have to 
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1 have him sentenced, and he's never shown up for the PSR. Can we 
2 have the PSR [inaudible]? 
3 THE COURT: Yeah, I was thinking let's wait and see 
4 what happens on that other case. 
5 
6 
7 
8 22nd? 
9 
MS. TURNER: Okay. 
THE COURT: And then let's do that on the 22nd. 
MR. POPPLETON: And is that 8:30 in the morning on the 
THE COURT: It was, yes, 8:30 in the morning on the 
10 22nd. All right. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. POPPLETON: Thank you, Judge. 
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